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Several years ago in Interpretation, an amicable but fierce debate played out 
between Werner Dannhauser and Hilail Gildin over the alleged atheism of 
Leo Strauss: Dannhauser leveled the charge of atheism, which he claimed that 
Strauss concealed, or at least muted, out of “his reverence for Judaism.”1 The 
evidence against Strauss is that he was a philosopher and that all philosophers 
are atheists. 2 At the risk of some inconsistency, Dannhauser asked readers 
1  See Hilail Gildin, “Deja Jew All Over Again: Dannhauser on Leo Strauss and Atheism,” Inter-
pretation 25, no. 1 (1997): 125–33. Gildin was responding to an essay by Dannhauser, “Athens and 
Jerusalem or Jerusalem and Athens,” in Leo Strauss and Judaism: Jerusalem and Athens Critically 
Revisited, ed. David Novak (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996), 155–71.
2  Strauss was publicly accused of atheism in Commentary magazine in 1959. His reply, which was 
never sent, was circulated among his students and later published by Kenneth Hart Green. Like 
Socrates, Strauss does not directly refute the charge of atheism; instead, he raises the question of the 
meaning of the charge: “My accuser has not even tried to prove his accusation. If he should be induced 
by this remark to try to prove his accusation, I warn him in advance to keep in mind the difference 
between revealed theology and natural theology or to make himself familiar with it.” See Green, 
Jew and Philosopher: The Return to Maimonides in the Jewish Thought of Leo Strauss (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1993), 238. 
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for leniency on the grounds that Strauss encouraged his students to take rev-
elation more seriously and that as a result, many (including Dannhauser) left 
Strauss’s classroom with a greater appreciation for the Bible. But why would 
a philosopher encourage his students to believe revelation? 
Charging philosophers with impiety and atheism is as old as philosophy 
itself; however, the meaning of impiety changed dramatically in modernity 
as exemplified by the life and work of Spinoza. Here, I refer not to the fact 
that Spinoza himself was accused (and convicted) of not believing in the God 
of the Bible, a charge for which there is compelling evidence. Rather, I mean 
the modern version of the charge that Spinoza leveled against Maimonides 
and medieval philosophy. Spinoza may have been the first philosopher to 
use freely the accusation of impiety to defame others. In chapter 7 of the 
Theologico-Political Treatise, Spinoza takes particular aim at Maimonides. 
He reports that Maimonides “supposes that the Prophets agreed among 
themselves in all things and were the highest caliber Philosophers.”3 To prove 
this, according to Spinoza, Maimonides developed a simple hermeneutical 
trick, namely, wherever the literal sense of scripture appears to contradict 
reason, the interpreter should abandon the literal meaning in favor of a 
symbolic interpretation.4 Maimonides realized, according to Spinoza, that 
the nonrational multitude would never willingly submit to the authority of 
philosophy, so he devised this hermeneutical strategy to conceal philosophy 
and present it as theology. Maimonides’s real motive was not piety, nor even 
the preservation of philosophy; rather, he was interested in power. He wished 
to create a “new kind of priest,” who could establish the authoritative reading 
of scripture. Maimonides’s strategy was soon adopted by other unscrupu-
lous and ambitious men who turned the interpretation of scripture into a 
violent sectarian affair. Spinoza reports that in his day, “the love of propagat-
ing divine religion [had] degenerated into sordid greed and ambition, and 
likewise the temple itself into a theater where…orators were heard, none of 
whom was bound by a desire for teaching the populace but for carrying them 
off in admiration for himself.”5 
Strauss’s verdict on the “case against Spinoza” concedes that Spinoza’s 
critique of scripture, including his attack on Maimonides, is “amazingly 
3  Benedict Spinoza, Theologico-Political Treatise, trans. Martin D. Yaffe (Newburyport, MA: Focus, 
2004), 99. 
4  See ibid., 97.
5  Ibid., preface, xix.
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unscrupulous.”6 By this he means that Spinoza uses scripture to undermine 
the belief in scripture by refuting the Maimonidean claim that it contains 
theoretical wisdom. But why did Spinoza attack Judaism and Maimonides so 
ferociously? Spinoza’s broader strategy was to separate completely philosophy 
and religion, and build a society that allows for freedom in both realms. Forc-
ing scripture to abandon its claims to theoretical truth was the price for that 
society, which Spinoza gladly paid in the hope that freedom would create more 
stable and tolerant communities: “the humanitarian end seems to justify every 
means: he plays a most dangerous game; his procedure is as much beyond 
good and evil as his God.”7 By undermining scripture and promoting free-
dom, Spinoza may have unwittingly undermined the foundations of justice. 
The success of Spinoza’s project can be attributed in large part to the stilted 
account he presents of Athens and Jerusalem: if Athens represents the univer-
sally true and demonstrable account of the whole and Jerusalem stands for a 
partial, superstitious account based on a particular (and therefore disputed) 
revelation, it is hardly surprising for Spinoza that reason or science prevails. 
With the victory of philosophy, a scholarly consensus emerged on Maimoni-
dean political theology as a relic of the past, a misguided attempt to harmonize 
philosophy and religion so that philosophy had the upper hand. By the time 
Strauss wrote his first book on Spinoza’s critique of religion, few scholars—
with the notable exception of Hermann Cohen—took Maimonides seriously 
as an alternative to Spinoza’s account of the theological-political problem. To 
understand Strauss’s thought, Kenneth Hart Green and Jeffrey Bernstein have 
written detailed accounts of how Strauss managed to recover Maimonides’s 
teaching and reinvigorate the debate between Athens and Jerusalem. 
According to Kenneth Green, Strauss’s Herculean effort to recover 
Maimonides is among the greatest scholarly achievements of the twentieth 
century. He estimates that the recovery of Maimonides is “one of four great 
scholarly rediscoveries of the 20th century in Jewish Studies, on par with 
[Strauss’s] friend Gershom Scholem’s recovery and presentation of Kabbalah, 
with the rescue, retrieval, and editing of the treasure trove of medieval mate-
rials stored in the Genizah of the Ben Ezra Synagogue in Cairo, and with the 
accidental uncovering…of the ancient Dead Sea Scrolls of the Second Tem-
ple–era Judea” (Complete Writings, xviii). Green’s scholarship has certainly 
6  Leo Strauss, “Preface to Spinoza’s Critique of Religion,” in Jewish Philosophy and the Crisis of 
Modernity, ed. Kenneth Hart Green (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 159. Hence-
forth JPCM.
7  Strauss, JPCM, 161.
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helped to establish Strauss’s place in Jewish studies, but his latest books have 
achieved something else: by collecting Strauss’s most important writings on 
Maimonides, Green has made it possible for students to follow the develop-
ment of Strauss’s thought and evaluate each of his discoveries.
Green is well positioned for this project, having spent his career devel-
oping a rich alternative to Spinoza’s account of the relation between Athens 
and Jerusalem by examining Strauss’s thought. Green’s first book, Jew and 
Philosopher: The Return to Maimonides in the Jewish Thought of Leo Strauss, 
presents Strauss as a “cognitive theist” rather than an atheist.8 This designa-
tion preserves Strauss’s openness to the truth of revelation which Spinoza had 
attempted to foreclose in the name of reason. According to Green, Strauss 
learned from Lessing that Spinoza’s rationalism had become dogmatic and 
as such became the very sort of authority that philosophy rebels against. To 
restore the ancient, truer meaning of philosophy, Lessing advised the use of 
revelation against the dogmatism of the Enlightenment. Green shows how 
Strauss, following this strategy, was able to remain loyal to Judaism and pur-
sue philosophy. With the addition of these two volumes, Leo Strauss and the 
Rediscovery of Maimonides and Leo Strauss on Maimonides: The Complete 
Writings, Green further demonstrates how Strauss learned from Maimonides 
a strategy for remaining loyal to both cities without compromising the claims 
of either. In other words, Maimonides presented Strauss with a compelling 
alternative to Spinoza’s account of the relation between Jerusalem and Athens. 
Strauss’s recovery of Maimonides, in Green’s presentation, allows simultane-
ously the recovery of ancient philosophy and the restoration of revelation. 
In Leo Strauss on Maimonides: The Complete Writings, Green has collected 
Strauss’s sixteen major essays and lectures on Maimonides, some of which 
have never before appeared in English. As Green admits, however, the title of 
the collection is somewhat misleading since “the aspiration to completeness 
could not be achieved perfectly” (xv). This is because Strauss made so many 
references to Maimonides and medieval philosophy throughout his career 
that any attempt to gather all of them would require several additional vol-
umes. Instead, Green has collected the pieces that illustrate Strauss’s gradual 
rediscovery of Maimonides as a thinker of the highest caliber, who surpassed 
in depth and audacity not only Strauss’s contemporaries but also Spinoza.
To appreciate the value of Green’s collection, consider Strauss’s essay 
“How to Begin to Study The Guide of the Perplexed.” It appeared in 1963 as 
the introductory essay to the monumental English translation of the Guide 
8  Green, Jew and Philosopher, 26–27, 167n27, 237n1, 239n2.
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by Shlomo Pines. Naturally, most newcomers to Maimonides and Strauss 
would see fit to begin their study with this essay. For one thing, it repre-
sents Strauss’s most extensive and complete account of how to approach the 
Guide. Strauss seems to suggest as much and begins the essay by presenting 
a detailed outline of the work: “I believe that it will not be amiss if I simply 
present the plan of the Guide as it has become clear to me in the course of 
about twenty-five years of frequently interrupted but never abandoned study” 
(493). Strauss’s title should not be misconstrued. The essay is hardly intended 
for novices who are just beginning their study of medieval philosophy. 
Strauss’s study presumes, like the Guide itself, years of prerequisite study and 
demonstrates how careful students of the Guide speak publicly about the text. 
(Strauss appears to present his findings in an esoteric style: the surface of the 
essay looks chaotic but is undergirded by a hidden structure.) Strauss’s essay 
is so complex—Green describes it as “the most impressive effort ever made 
to map the plan and structure of Maimonides’ great book”—that Green does 
not even attempt to summarize it (63). Rather, he offers twelve clusters of 
questions or perplexities for the reader to ponder. 
If Strauss’s essay represents the peak of his lifelong study of Maimonides, 
Green’s collection helps us approach this summit gradually. Strauss’s essays are 
arranged chronologically so that the reader can see how he managed, step by 
step, to recover Maimonides’s thought. In addition, Green has chosen several 
pieces that Strauss himself did not choose to publish during his lifetime but 
which show the difficulties that he encountered and how he managed to over-
come them. Among the earliest pieces, Green includes unfinished notes from 
a lecture in Berlin on Hermann Cohen and Maimonides. One reason Strauss 
did not finish these notes is that he was still struggling to understand how 
to read Maimonides. In sharp contrast, the collection also includes Strauss’s 
masterful lecture nearly thirty years later in Chicago, modestly entitled “Intro-
duction to Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed.” Here we see Strauss in total 
control of the content and the presentation. In less than thirty years, Strauss 
learned to read the Guide and, as Green observes, “overturn several centuries 
of entrenched conventional scholarly wisdom” in the process (xix). 
Green explains in detail the obstacles with which Strauss contended: 
scholars tended to view Maimonides as a thinker who prepared the way for 
subsequent thinkers, who presumably surpassed him. From their point of 
view, one may admire Maimonides’s contributions to intellectual progress, 
yet also admit that the same progress has rendered his thought obsolete. One 
way that modern thought has surpassed Maimonides is by separating reason 
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from revelation, a prerequisite for clearing out superstition and promoting 
scientific and moral progress. Our freedom, particularly from superstitions 
such as the belief in revelation, is one hallmark of our progress. The alterna-
tive to this view was virtually lost until Strauss entertained the possibility 
that medieval and ancient philosophy achieved a “natural perspective…[an] 
enduring perception of human things as they present themselves in their 
unchanged, essential manifestation” (23).
Nor did Strauss dodge the most compelling parts of Spinoza’s critique, 
such as his account of the prophets as individuals who could rely only on their 
imaginations because of their severely limited knowledge of nature. In his 1935 
essay “Maimonides’ Doctrine of Prophecy and Its Sources,” Strauss coins the 
term “prophetology” to describe the Maimonidean approach to divine law, 
which resembles the Platonic approach to political science whereby prophecy 
is viewed as a branch of it. Whereas Spinoza insists that reason and imagina-
tion cannot be combined in a single human being, Maimonides argues that 
the best lawgiver combines both and is the most perfect human being. The 
prophet, like the Platonic philosopher king, is the most perfect individual and 
as such most qualified to establish the best society. The divine law combines 
religion and politics to order society in the most rational way. Nor could the 
best society be ordered in any other way since rationality has limited author-
ity among the nonrational individuals who are always the majority. 
To describe the divine law as the best law means that its rationality is 
balanced by its ability to appeal imaginatively to nonrational individuals. 
This is what Green describes as a “unique balance” between reason and rev-
elation; the tension between them is managed in such a way as to maintain 
the integrity of both (26). Maimonides “first accepts and obeys the Law,” by 
whose authority he finds justification for a “life devoted to reason” (27). In 
Philosophy and Law (1935), Strauss argues that modern political thought had 
discredited this delicate balance such that the only compelling alternatives 
appear to be “orthodoxy or atheism.” Neither alternative appealed to Strauss; 
instead he sought to rediscover another possibility that could be embraced 
“by rational people…and not merely as an extravagant gesture or act of will, 
bespeaking despair, muddle-headedness, distress, or loss of nerve” (30). Such 
a possibility entails an approach to scripture and Law that does not cut them 
off from reason. 
Following the thought of Maimonides led Strauss to another unexpected 
discovery. In contrast to the scholarly consensus that insisted on seeing 
Maimonides as a disciple of Aristotle, Strauss discovered from Farabi that 
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Maimonides was instead closer to Plato: “Plato had already discovered the 
principles that were vital to advance the freedom of philosophic thinking in its 
theological-political context” (32). In “The Place of the Doctrine of Providence 
according to Maimonides” (1937), Strauss shows how Maimonides adapts the 
Platonic distinction between the few and the many to his interpretation of 
the Law. His dual teaching of providence includes a general sense of provi-
dence for those who follow the Law and contribute to the collective order, and 
particular providence for those who are intellectually excellent. Intellectual 
virtue remains preeminent, but it does not undermine moral virtue. 
As Strauss became more attentive to the demands of Platonic philosophy, 
his care in reading Maimonides became even more rigorous. Reviewing a 
new translation of Maimonides’s Mishneh Torah in 1939, Strauss complains 
that the translator has not paid enough attention to the precision of the author 
in numbering paragraphs, translating key terms consistently, and in general 
assuming that Maimonides’s writing was anything but as “careful, precise, 
artful, deliberate, and thoughtful as it is possible for a human author to 
achieve” (43). Within two years, Strauss would publish his discovery, in “The 
Literary Character of the Guide of the Perplexed” (1941), that the literary style 
of the Guide was the key to unraveling its political teaching. Maimonides had 
openly admitted to choosing every word of the Guide deliberately and care-
fully. Even where he appeared to contradict himself, he had assured readers, 
this too was deliberate. The fact that the surface of the text appears disorga-
nized or haphazard should not discourage us from observing the profound 
depths of the book. In other words, Maimonides’s esotericism is hidden in 
plain sight. Why then had it been so completely neglected by modern schol-
arship? The assumptions that inform that scholarship have an important 
source in Spinoza’s hermeneutics, particularly chapter 7 of the Treatise, which 
explains how to read the Bible. According to Spinoza, the chaotic surface of 
the biblical text does not conceal any profound depth. Rather, the surface is 
exactly what it appears to be, that is, a hastily compiled amalgam of sources: 
“faulty, truncated, adulterated, not consistent with itself, [and] we have only 
fragments of it.”9 Despite subsequent efforts to harmonize the text, there is 
little point in searching for wisdom beyond the surface. Modern scholars are 
trained to confirm that the Bible mostly reflects the cultural background and 
prejudices of its authors, as well as a simple teaching of caritas. Spinoza has 
trained us moderns to stop our interpretation at the literal surface of the text.
9  Spinoza, Theologico-Political Treatise, 14.
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Maimonides’s account invites us to consider that, however rare it may be, 
wisdom is a permanent, trans-historical possibility, and that such wisdom is 
contained in revelation, including knowledge of the best human life and the 
best form of political organization. Nor is scripture naive about the threats 
to that life, particularly that posed by superstition. It offers the most power-
ful program ever conceived to limit superstitious ignorance and enlighten 
humanity. Another hallmark of the wisdom of scripture is its recognition of 
the limits of enlightenment and the permanent divide between the few and the 
many. According to Maimonides, this wisdom is embodied in a literary style 
that simultaneously addresses the different desires and needs of each group. 
The apparent chaos on the surface of the Bible is actually a brilliant strategy 
to address individuals of varying rationality. Such a style can be achieved 
only by the most perfect individuals, the prophets, who miraculously achieve 
perfection of the intellect and imagination— the very possibility that Spinoza 
denies at the beginning of the Treatise. 
In addition, the literary style implies a profound concern for the well-being 
and the enlightenment of everyone, regardless of one’s level of rationality. The 
lexicographic chapters at the beginning of the Guide indicate a basic level of 
knowledge that everyone is obliged to accept lest he transgress the law by 
committing idolatry. The public dimension of Maimonides’s teaching gives 
way to the secret teachings of the Torah, but these secrets are concealed with 
extraordinary care (see Green’s catalog of these means at Complete Writings, 
47). Those who take care to penetrate the secret teaching are presumably 
obliged by their wisdom above all not to divulge things that may undermine 
the well-being of the others (or the stability of the society). The fact that teach-
ings are allegedly hidden, and that those who discover them may not divulge 
their discoveries, leads to endless speculation about the true meaning of the 
Torah. Can we ever be certain that Maimonides means what he says? As in 
a Platonic dialogue, the literary style emphasizes questions and the quest for 
certainty—even more than answers. This helps explain why it is so difficult to 
get to the bottom of Maimonides’s project, even with Strauss’s analysis.
Strauss had misgivings about the choice between atheism and orthodoxy 
that he faced as “a young Jew born and raised in Germany.”10 Both choices 
demanded commitments that Strauss was unwilling to make. The atheism 
of his peers was based not on love of truth, but on a love of cruelty turned 
inward, that is, a willingness to suffer as a sign of rectitude. Such a com-
mitment could have been justified if Spinoza had been successful in giving 
10  Strauss, JPCM, 137.
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a full and rational explanation of the whole. Since he was not, it was a mere 
act of faith not necessarily superior to religion. To make matters worse, this 
version of atheism was not moderated by reason, and tended to gravitate 
toward extreme political teachings. On the other hand, Spinoza’s success in 
criticizing Maimonides appeared to render the choice for orthodoxy even less 
palatable, since it rested on belief in revelation that appeared to be no more 
than an irrational and fantastic dream. Strauss set out to restore both Jerusa-
lem and Athens, as Green persuasively argues, with Maimonides as his guide. 
This explains why, as we saw above, Strauss’s students left his courses 
with renewed respect for both reason and revelation. But Green’s account, 
while persuasive, also raises some troubling questions. The defense of Mai-
monides involves showing the possibility, contra Spinoza, that scripture 
contains theoretical wisdom. But apart from his posthumously published 
lecture “On the Interpretation of Genesis,” Strauss makes relatively little 
effort to do so.11 In addition, Green’s collection reveals that Strauss did most 
of his work on Maimonides in the thirties. After 1941, there are relatively 
few studies devoted exclusively to Maimonides. There is, to be sure, the 
important effort Strauss made to have the Guide translated into English in 
1963—an effort that leaves no doubt about his reverence for Maimonides. 
But Strauss’s prodigious scholarly output is primarily devoted to Athens. One 
might wonder whether Strauss turned from Maimonides to Plato as a result 
of his “rediscovery” of Maimonides. Or, as Spinoza suggests, whether respect 
for Jerusalem merely conceals an attempt to establish the authority of Athens. 
Green insists otherwise: 
Strauss expresses his conviction that, however much Maimonides 
made use of Greek philosophy, what he presents as his definitive 
teaching is affirmatively Jewish. This is not merely Greek philosophy 
with a Jewish veneer, but is an attempt to wrestle with the challenge of 
ancient Greek thought, and with what the best Greek thinkers taught 
about God, man, and the world in order to, if possible, make it consis-
tent with Jewish teachings. (61)
Green’s two volumes establish the importance of Strauss’s rediscovery of 
Maimonides and, more generally, the need to study medieval rationalism 
in order to grasp the limits of modern rationalism. At the same time, and 
11  Leo Strauss, “On the Interpretation of Genesis,” in JPCM, 359–76. Also see Leo Strauss, “Jerusalem 
and Athens: Some Preliminary Reflections,” in JPCM, 377–405.
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to Green’s great credit, his collection and commentary do not suppress the 
central questions about the relation of Athens and Jerusalem.12 
Indeed, Green has pursued theoretical alternatives openly and vigor-
ously as the director of the SUNY Press series The Thought and Legacy 
of Leo Strauss, inviting a range of serious contributions from scholars of 
Strauss’s thought. The most recent addition to this series is Jeffrey Bernstein’s 
Leo Strauss: On the Borders of Judaism, Philosophy, and History. Like Green, 
Bernstein affirms the centrality of Maimonides for understanding Strauss 
(51, 162–63). He also argues that Maimonides made it possible for Strauss 
to recover both Jerusalem and Athens and this recovery makes him a most 
original and important critic of modern Jewish thought (see 34). In addition, 
Bernstein’s account supplements and extends Green’s analysis. For example, 
in an original and penetrating reading of What Is Political Philosophy?, Bern-
stein shows that Strauss deliberately avoided mentioning Maimonides during 
his lectures at the Hebrew University in 1953 in order not to upset his audi-
ence (130). This helps demonstrate that Maimonides plays a central role in 
grasping the meaning of Strauss’s mature thought, even when he is hidden 
from view (127).
But Bernstein’s account of Maimonides and his relation to Spinoza 
diverges from Green’s in interesting ways. Taking as his starting point 
Strauss’s correspondence in the thirties, Bernstein argues that Maimonides 
represents for Strauss a philosopher “who is theoretically uncompromising 
in his advocacy of philosophy and who also wrote exoterically in order not 
to upset the community in which he lived” (xxvii). Maimonides recovered 
Platonic political philosophy and moved into Athens, where Strauss found 
him and also took up residence (47–48): Maimonides “was a citizen of Ath-
ens donning the outfit of Jerusalem” (131). Strauss too, following Machiavelli, 
conceals his blasphemy and thereby “compels the reader to think the blas-
12  Green has rightly pointed out in a recent interview that it would be foolish to interrogate Strauss to 
discover his view of Jerusalem: “If some people might be inclined to set up a Jewish inquisition, and 
suspect every Jewish thinker or even every Jewish person, and to examine or interrogate them for how 
much, or how precisely, they believed in every article of the faith as defined by Maimonides, I can’t 
vouch for what the exact result would have been in the case of Leo Strauss. But I also don’t think that 
this is a very Jewish thing to do. Rather, we should judge Strauss by his actions; and in terms of these, 
we would see that he was a profoundly loyal Jew during his entire life” (https://kavvanah.wordpress.
com/2013/07/18/why-maimonides-matters-kenneth-hart-green-part-i/). But, while relentless inquiry 
and theoretical boldness are unseemly for a citizen of Jerusalem, do such traits not characterize (leav-
ing aside the violence) the spirit of inquiry in Athens?
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phemy by himself and thus to become [his] accomplice.”13 Bernstein makes 
an even bolder argument in chapter 5, where he suggests that according to 
Strauss, both Spinoza and Maimonides shared the same “compulsion” for the 
truth, “be it construed as Platonic eros…or Spinozan conatus” (150). In this 
reading of Persecution and the Art of Writing, the “differences between the 
two…appear to be historical rather than philosophical. Differently stated, the 
divergence between the two thinkers concerns their modes of presentation 
more than the content of their thought” (153). 
As for the differences between Spinoza and Maimonides, Bernstein 
argues that they are more apparent than real. Spinoza’s radical critique of 
religion, for example, was not original; rather it had been rediscovered by 
Machiavelli who in turn had learned it from medieval and pagan philoso-
phy (127). In fact, it had been well known to Maimonides, who chose to 
conceal it from all except his more careful readers. Strauss says that Mai-
monides “brought the greatest sacrifice” by defending the Torah against the 
philosophers. Bernstein interprets this sacrifice to be Maimonides’s politi-
cal and religious accommodation of his philosophic thought to the Jewish 
people, even though he affirmed the superiority of intellectual to moral vir-
tue (129–32). From this point of view, the conflict between Jerusalem and 
Athens appears to be a version of the tension between the imagination and 
reason, which Spinoza describes as the problem of superstition. The fact that 
each presents a different solution to the conflict represents the historical or 
accidental circumstances in which each thinker found himself: “In another 
age, or even in another country, Spinoza would have been compelled by his 
principle of caution to make entirely different proposals for the protection of 
philosophy, without changing in the least his philosophical thought.”14
Had Bernstein merely portrayed Strauss as an advocate of Athens, his 
account would have been nearly identical to Heinrich Meier’s presentation 
of Strauss “as a political philosopher who never wavers from his attempts to 
disprove revelation” (137).15 Instead, Bernstein devotes much of his analysis 
13  This is Strauss’s description of Machiavelli, but Bernstein uses it to describe Strauss’s treatment of 
Maimonides (see 127–28).
14  Leo Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), 192, 
quoted in Bernstein, 153. 
15  In chapter 5, Bernstein distinguishes his position from Meier’s presentation of Strauss as a mod-
ern atheist political philosopher in Leo Strauss and the Theological-Political Problem (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006). According to Bernstein, Meier’s presentation claims that Strauss 
does not take revelation seriously as an alternative to philosophy, but rather “holds that philosophy 
needs the existence of revelation only insofar as that existence allows philosophers to better see the 
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to Strauss’s preoccupation with Judaism, particularly his efforts to rescue 
modern Jewish thought from its devotion to historicism and the belief in 
progress. One of the most fascinating sections of Bernstein’s argument is 
his chapter “Strauss’s Maimonides,” which shows both Strauss’s debt to his 
fellow scholars of Jewish thought and his radical rejection of their work. 
Bernstein also shows how Strauss’s stay at the Hebrew University of Jerusa-
lem in 1954–55 culminated in his attempt to address the meaning of Zionism 
without undermining the modern Jewish state. In short, according to Bern-
stein, Strauss may not have been a believer, but he was certainly devoted to 
the study of Jewish thought (83, 23, 34). This paradox, that Strauss remained 
devoted to Judaism without being a believer, rests at the heart of Bernstein’s 
inquiry. How did Strauss manage to reconcile the love of one’s own with the 
love of the good?
Fittingly, Bernstein crafts his answer from Strauss’s own remarks explain-
ing that the prophets and Socrates do not live in the center of the city, but at 
the periphery: “The man who loves perfection and justice must leave the cities 
inhabited exclusively by the wicked, to search for a city inhabited by good 
men, and he must prefer, if he does not know of such a city or if he is pre-
vented from bringing one about, wandering in the desert or in caverns to the 
association with evil men.”16 According to Bernstein, Strauss chose to live “on 
the border” so that he could seek the good in full view of other alternatives. 
Some borders are more lasting and comprehensive than others. National bor-
ders, for example, are not as comprehensive as the border between reason and 
revelation, a border upon which the West itself was founded. Even though 
Strauss settled in Athens, he lived on the border where he had a full view of 
Jerusalem, where the attraction of revelation was perpetually in view. As a 
result, Strauss was able to resist dogmatism and sectarianism; in fact, this 
appears to be the precondition for philosophy, one shared by Maimonides, 
Spinoza, and Strauss.
To live on the border, for Bernstein, means to take seriously the tension 
between reason and revelation, and the centrality of this tension is easy to 
identify in the work of Maimonides and Strauss. The case of Spinoza is more 
challenging because the “chief purpose” of his Theologico-Political Treatise is 
alternative to the philosophical way of life; in seeing this alternative, philosophers better understand 
their own way of life” (137).
16  Leo Strauss, “Some Remarks on the Political Science of Maimonides and Farabi,” in Complete Writ-
ings, ed. Green, 305; quoted in Bernstein, 13 (cf. 85).
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to redraw the borders.17 On this new map, revelation surrenders to reason all 
claims to the truth. Spinoza’s residence may still be located on the outskirts, 
but the map seems to have changed dramatically. Furthermore, according 
to Strauss, Spinoza lived in temporary housing while he built a new city and 
a new church. The foundation for this city was a new conception of God. 
Spinoza “showed the way toward a new religion or religiousness which was 
to inspire a wholly new kind of society, a new kind of Church. He became 
the sole father of that new Church which was to be universal in fact.”18 Bern-
stein admits that it appears “Spinoza’s thought is the precise rejection of 
Maimonides’s thought,” but in fact remains closely attached to Maimoni-
dean thought in maintaining the superiority of the theoretical life over the 
practical life (136). This philosopher does not move his residence, even if his 
neighbors—the particular form of superstition—move. Spinoza’s claim that 
Maimonides wished to create “a new form of ecclesiastical authority,” namely 
reason, turns out to apply equally well to Spinoza himself. 
One might wonder whether Spinoza, in redrawing the borders and 
founding a new church, has managed to resist the temptation to dogma or, 
in other words, whether the revolt of philosophy initiated by Machiavelli 
remains located in Athens. Such questions and many others raised in these 
stimulating and important volumes are well worth pondering as we decide, 
as Strauss urges us to do, which city to live in: “No one can be both a philoso-
pher and a theologian, or, for that matter, some possibility which transcends 
the conflict between philosophy and theology, or pretends to be a synthesis 
of both. But every one of us can be and ought to be either one or the other, 
the philosopher open to the challenge of theology, or the theologian open to 
the challenge of philosophy.”19 Bernstein and Green have done a great service 
for students seeking residence in either Jerusalem or Athens by clarifying the 
fundamental issues that separate them. 
17  Spinoza, Theologico-Political Treatise, chap. 14.
18  Strauss, JPCM, 156.
19  Strauss, JPCM, 116.
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